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by Sian Moore and Stephen Wood
In place 
of strife
New Labour honoured a pre-election pledge to the trade unions
when it introduced a statutory union recognition procedure in
2000. Sian Moore and Stephen Wood assess how it has fared
in its first two years.
I
n the foreword to the 1998 White Paper “Fairness at
Work”, Tony Blair described statutory union recognition
as part of the lasting industrial relations settlement that
he wanted to achieve in his first Parliament, a settlement
designed to maintain and extend peaceful employment
relations. He stressed, though, that unions and employ-
ers should find voluntary solutions to their problems over
union representation and that the statutory recognition
procedure should only be used as a long stop. 
Nonetheless, a new legal procedure was introduced in June
2000 to deal with cases where a recognition dispute cannot
be settled voluntarily and the Conciliation and Arbitration
Committee (CAC) was charged with handling it. Labour’s
declared aim was to provide a right for union recognition
where a majority of the workforce wants it. The core
features of the statutory procedure reflect this. 
Its essential feature, in comparison with the two past statu-
tory systems, is the specification of unambiguous criteria for
the acceptance of applications and the subsequent granting
of recognition. The CAC can only accept an application
from a union to establish a bargaining unit:
n in companies with 21 or more employees;
n where at least 10% of the employees are union
members;
n providing there is not already a collective agreement
covering some or all employees;
n if it is satisfied that a majority of employees are likely 
to be in favour of recognition. 
Once an application is accepted and the bargaining unit
settled, if the majority in it are union members, the CAC
may declare the union recognised. If less than a majority are
union members, it must order a ballot in which the union has
to secure a majority of those voting and 40% of those
balloted. Even where 50% or more of employees are union
members, the CAC must decide whether certain conditions
have been met before it can grant recognition without a
ballot, one of which is whether this would be “in the inter-
ests of good industrial relations”.
The CAC is also empowered to make judgements on the
appropriateness of the bargaining unit. If the union and
employer are not agreed on the bargaining unit by the time
the application has been accepted, then the CAC must
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decide if the union’s proposed unit meets certain criteria.
The most significant of these is that it is “compatible with
effective management”. If it is not, then the CAC deter-
mines an alternative bargaining unit.
After two years it is still too early to judge the full effects of
the legislation. First, the number of applications has not
been large – 176 in the first 22 months. However, 24 of
these were withdrawn and then resubmitted. Thus there
have only been 152 distinct cases. Second, it is too soon to
assess the nature of collective bargaining emerging from
statutory recognition, or the effectiveness of the proce-
dure’s enforcement mechanisms. But there have been suffi-
cient cases to give some indication of how the CAC is
exercising its discretionary power and for us to speculate
whether the legislation is helping to reverse the decline in
union membership experienced since the early 1980s.
The CAC has so far decided on the acceptability of 102
applications. Only eleven of these have been deemed not to
have met the criteria for acceptability: seven because the
CAC gauged that a majority of the proposed bargaining unit
was not likely to favour recognition; three because collec-
tive bargaining agreements already existed; and one
because the employer had less than 21 employees.
The CAC has not settled on a rigid rule, such as a given
level of current union membership, for deciding whether
support for collective bargaining is likely. An application
where membership was as low as 16% has been
accepted, while one with 36% has been rejected. Our
analysis of the cases so far does, however, suggest that,
unless other really convincing evidence is provided, appli-
cations are only likely to be accepted when a union has at
least 35% membership in the bargaining unit. Such
evidence is usually in the form of a petition or letters of
support. The CAC will also take into account a union’s diffi-
culties in securing access to workers in the workplace. For
example, in the case of a television company, MTV, the
CAC accepted an application from the Broadcasting,
Entertainment, Cinematograph and Theatre Union (BECTU)
on the basis of 19% membership and a petition in support
of recognition signed by 55 of those in a bargaining unit of
119 (46%). The CAC stated that it understood that the
union had conducted its petition outside company premises
and was unlikely to have had access to all workers in the
bargaining unit.
The CAC has ruled on the appropriateness of a bargaining
unit in 31 cases. It has supported the union’s proposed unit
in 21 of these and a variation of the union’s proposed unit
in two. It has upheld employer objections in six and deter-
mined a different bargaining unit in two. In the case of 18
out of the 19 single-site companies before the CAC, the
employer has argued for a “whole company” approach,
including all the key occupations. In all but one of these
cases, the CAC has resisted this argument on the basis
that it has been demonstrated that the terms and conditions
of the occupational group proposed are distinctive. The
exception was the Staffordshire Sentinel newspaper, where
the CAC decided that all editorial staff, and not just journal-
ists, should be included in the National Union of Journalists’
claim. In two multi-site companies, the employers success-
fully argued that all key occupations should be included. In
one of these, the Essex Chronicle group, the CAC again
determined that the bargaining unit should comprise all
editorial staff and not just journalists.
In six out of eight multi-site company cases before it, the
CAC has ruled that the bargaining unit should embrace
workers sharing the same distinct terms and conditions on
all sites in the organisation. In the case of Ryanair this ruling
was in line with the union’s proposed bargaining unit.
However, in the other five cases the union’s proposed
bargaining unit was based on one site and it could not
demonstrate sufficient support for recognition amongst the
workers on the other sites subsequently included in the
bargaining unit. In two of these cases – Hygena and DHL
(Aviation) – following the redefinition of the bargaining unit
the CAC ruled that the application was no longer valid on
the grounds that there would not be sufficient support for
recognition in the “new”, larger bargaining unit. In another
two – Getty Images and Maxims Casino – the union
withdrew the case immediately after the CAC’s decision, in
the knowledge that it lacked the required support. In one
case – Seabrook Crisps – the union did not withdraw and
a ballot was lost.
There are two exceptions to the general trend of the CAC’s
rulings. In the case of Daryl Industries, the CAC backed the
union and included only one of three sites because the
company already had separate Works Councils for each
site. And, in the case of Kwik-Fit, the CAC allowed the
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The number of applications has not been large
union’s proposed bargaining unit, based upon the London
region only. 
There have been 20 submissions where the union has had
more than 50% membership and the CAC has thus had to
decide whether to ballot the bargaining unit. So far, recog-
nition without a ballot has been awarded by the CAC in 12
of these cases. In one of the eight cases where a ballot
was ordered – where the application at the UK branch of
Turkiye Is Bankasi involved 17 union members out of a
bargaining unit of 21 – three members of the union wrote
to the CAC stating they did not want the union to conduct
collective bargaining on their behalf. The union submitted
that these employees had done this under pressure from
the employer. Nonetheless the CAC was bound to call a
ballot, as one of the qualifying conditions is that a signifi-
cant number of union members do not wish to have collec-
tive bargaining conducted on their behalf. In the cases of
Huntleigh Healthcare and Unipart DCM Jaguar, the CAC
determined there should be ballots because, in the first
instance, membership had been recruited on the basis of
no subscriptions and, in the second, on the basis of
reduced subscription rates outside of the union’s rules. In
the case of Red Letter, the CAC invoked the “in-the-inter-
ests-of-good-industrial-relations” criteria, as it was aware
that relations between the parties had not been particularly
harmonious and judged that a ballot would “resolve any
uncertainty and clear the air”. This contrasts with the case
of Fullarton Computer Industries, where over 50.3% of the
bargaining unit were union members. Here the panel
stated that “in this case the holding of a formal ballot, 
with each side campaigning for employee support for 
its position, would be likely to engender further 
antagonism and divisiveness detrimental to developing
good industrial relations”. 
Of the 33 ballots ordered by the CAC, unions have lost
eight out of the 29 of those where the outcome is known to
us. In seven of the lost ballots the proportion of workers in
favour of recognition was lower than the proportion of
members at the time of the application. This also happened
in one case where the union was victorious. Such
outcomes may reflect labour turnover in the bargaining unit,
or the ineffectiveness of the union campaign. Yet our
research has revealed evidence that in some cases they
reflect employer hostility during the ballot or even intimida-
tory behaviour beforehand. For example, in the Turkiye Is
Bankasi case, where only three employees had indicated to
the CAC that they did not want collective bargaining, only
35% voted in favour of the union, despite a union member-
ship level when the application was made of 80%
There have been four applications for judicial review of
CAC decisions. The issues these concerned are: the confi-
dentiality of union membership data (Essex Chronicle
Series); the determination of the bargaining unit (Kwik-Fit);
the impact on ballot results of recruitment into the bargain-
ing unit after the submission of an application (Ryanair); and
the decision to grant recognition without a ballot and the
delegation of membership checks to the case manager
(both in Fullarton Computer Industries). With the Essex
Chronicle, the application was withdrawn and with Ryanair
the applicant was not granted a hearing. In the first case to
have been heard (Fullarton Computer Industries), CAC
procedures were upheld; in the second (Kwik-Fit), they
were not, but this decision was overturned on appeal. In the
Fullarton case, the employer challenged the reasoning
behind the panel’s decision not to hold a ballot. The judge
concluded that the panel’s discretion had not been
exercised in an irrational or flawed way, although he did
suggest that a ballot might have been appropriate in the
circumstances, but stressed this was a personal view.
At the end of the CAC’s first 22 months, 110 cases had
been dealt with and 40 are live as we write. Of the cases
for which we have information, recognition was granted
through the procedure in 33 cases (30% of those
completed). In addition, 41 applications have been
withdrawn at some stage, because the employer and
union had come to or were discussing a voluntary agree-
ment. This means that 74 (67%) of cases that have
passing through the CAC procedure have resulted in
recognition or discussions on recognition; and 27% of the
cases are known not to have resulted in recognition. (The
outcome of the remaining 5% of cases is currently not
known to us.)
The number of cases processed is slightly fewer than the
number of cases that the Advisory, Conciliation and
Arbitration Service (ACAS) investigated in the first two
years of the procedure that it operated in the 1970s, the last
time there was a statutory recognition system. But the
number of applications is considerably fewer, as under
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Applications are only likely to be accepted when a union has at
least 35% membership in the bargaining unit – unless
additional evidence of support for recognition is provided
ACAS unions were able to put in applications without
having any members. The Association of Scientific,
Managerial and Technical Staff (ASTMS) was particularly
prone to do this as a first move in a recognition campaign. 
The proposed bargaining units in applications thus far have
been relatively small, a median of 87 employees, with 41%
having over 100 workers, 29% fewer than 50 and only
17% having over 250. CAC rulings on bargaining units
suggest that unions are more likely to succeed at this stage
in single-site companies, or by limiting bargaining units to
narrow groups of workers with distinctive terms and condi-
tions. Faced with the difficulty of recruiting sufficient
members in large, multi-site organisations, unions may be
encouraged by the legislation to approach employers at
national level for a voluntary agreement. 
The direct impact of the CAC procedure is limited. The
cases where it has granted recognition cover under
10,000 workers. And 4,000 of these are accounted for by
the AEEU’s successful recognition ballot at Honda at
Swindon. In addition, the 22 semi-voluntary cases where
we have been able to acquire figures represent around
5,000 workers. 
Moreover, the CAC cases so far have been concentrated
in a limited number of industrial sectors and those in which
unions have historically had a presence. Nearly half of both
applications and the successful cases have been in
manufacturing, with around 10% each in transport, print,
newspapers and finance. 
However, unions have not just relied on the statutory
procedure. The voluntary route to recognition, the only
means available for the 20 years from 1980 to 2000, has
been increasingly successful in achieving results. The TUC
recorded 450 new voluntary agreements signed between
November 2000 and October 2001, representing nearly
three times those achieved for the previous 12 months and
covering an estimated 120,000 workers. Similarly, ACAS
has experienced a significant increase in requests for
collective conciliation assistance over recognition, both
prior to the introduction of the statutory procedure and
subsequently. 
For the first ten year’s of ACAS’s life (1975-1985), the
annual number of cases was consistently over 200 (the
highest figure being 697 in 1976), but this dropped
steadily to a low point of 93 in 1994. The figure returned to
over 200 in 2000 for the first time since 1985. As a propor-
tion of the conciliation workload of ACAS, it reached nearly
18%, the highest figure since the 1970s. Even more signif-
icantly, full recognition was agreed in a record 65% of the
cases. This trend in voluntary recognition suggests that the
procedure is having an indirect effect and that its shadow
is influencing unions and employers to reach agreements
when they might otherwise not have done.
The limited number of CAC applications reflects a combi-
nation of factors. First, the design of the statutory proce-
dure has prescribed which cases are likely to be accepted
and to meet the thresholds required for recognition.
Second, when the procedure came on stream there were
very few ready-made cases that could be submitted to the
CAC. This is confirmed by a survey of private sector
workplaces with 50 or more employees that we
conducted in August 2000. This showed, on the one
hand, that there were many workplaces (90%) either with
no union recognition or where groups of workers were not
covered by recognition for collective bargaining. On the
other hand, it showed that in only just under a third of
these workplaces were there any union members. In
fewer than 10% of workplaces was there 10% or more
union membership – the minimum required for acceptance
by the CAC – and only a tiny minority of these had more
than 50% membership, or anything like the sort of level
that the CAC would require to demonstrate majority
support for recognition.
Third, the unions have carefully managed their use of the
procedure. In line with the commitment to using the legis-
lation as a last resort made by the TUC in its joint statement
with the CBI before it came in, the majority of unions that
we surveyed in early 2001 reported that they would, in the
first instance, aim to achieve voluntary recognition through
majority membership. In addition, unions were concerned
that cases submitted to the CAC should not be lost, so
they aimed to submit cases that they were confident would
secure automatic recognition or win a ballot. Consistent
with this, in 50% of the CAC applications that have been
decided unions had at least 50% membership (and in 80%
the membership was at least 35% of the proposed
bargaining unit). Centralised internal procedures were
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Nearly half of the successful cases
have been in manufacturing
established in the majority of unions to control the flow of
cases to the CAC and most TUC-affiliated unions allowed
the TUC an advisory role in the submission of applications.
Taken together, these factors suggest that unions will have
to substantially intensify their recruitment efforts to signifi-
cantly extend union recognition, either through the legisla-
tion or under the threat of its use. Our workplace survey
showed that employers are unlikely to initiate union recog-
nition discussions. When they do, it will be where union
membership is approaching the proportion where a CAC
case could be won and/or to exclude a particular union in
favour of another. This latter kind of behaviour is illustrated
by one CAC case where the ISTC put in a claim for 
recognition at Bausch and Lomb, only to have it rejected
on the grounds that there was already a recognition agree-
ment in place – an agreement with an independent 
union that had in fact only been reached two days before
the application. 
The legislation has been designed to ensure that employers
both co-operate with the CAC (as all were not prepared to
do with ACAS in the 1970s) and reach agreements with the
union involved once it has been awarded a recognition order
by the CAC. It also guarantees that access to the workforce
is given to the union during a ballot. But it does not prevent
employers from placing undue pressure upon employees
when a case is in the pipeline or from victimising activists.
Neither does the procedure allow the union access to the
workforce or workplace outside the ballot period. 
Yet the results of our survey revealed that the aim of the vast
majority of unions is to gain significant numbers of
members, rather than to seek voluntary recognition regard-
less of the level of union membership. The largest unions
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are putting more resources into organising and we found
that unions for whom new recognitions are important are
indeed taking a systematic approach. The legislation has
played a role in this, as the unions have a greater confi-
dence that there will be a return on any investment they
make in recruitment and organising. 
The CAC system is the third such statutory recognition
procedure to have been tried in the UK. The first, intro-
duced by the 1971 Industrial Relations Act, was largely
ineffective as the unions did not register as intended. The
second (ACAS) ultimately became inoperable because
rulings in key judicial reviews meant that ACAS concluded
that it could not operate the procedure properly. The
prospects for the survival of this third attempt look more
promising. Judicial reviews have not as yet threatened its
operation. Its key design features, the way the CAC has
worked it so far and the unions’ approach all bode well for
its future. The success rate of CAC applications suggests
that in most cases recognition is being granted where the
majority of the workforce is in the union. Yet the number of
ballots that have been lost despite majority union member-
ship means that this outcome is not inevitable and indicates
that employer resistance may be playing a role. 
But the implication of our research on the procedure’s first
two years is that its direct effects are likely to be marginal.
Its shadow effect, the signing of voluntary agreements,
looks like being greater. This suggests that the statutory
route can, paradoxically, support or even enhance what
remains of the “voluntary” tradition of UK industrial relations.
Yet the scale of the task facing unions in reversing member-
ship decline remains great, regardless of employer opposi-
tion, and will involve their organising well beyond their
conventional terrains.
Sian Moore is a Research Officer at the CEP.
Stephen Wood is Research Chair of the Institute for Work
Psychology at the University of Sheffield and a Research
Associate of the CEP. 
Further reading 
Wood, S., Moore, S. and Willman, P. (2002), ÒThird Time lucky
for statutory union recognition in the UK?Ó, available from the CEP
(Working Paper No. 1189). A version of the Working Paper will
appear in the Industrial Relations Journal, August 2002.
Stephen Wood and Paul Davies, ÒA sword of Damocles: New
Labour and statutory recognitionÓ, CentrePiece Summer 2000.
Both authors are members of the CEP’s Leverhulme Future of
Trade Unionism in Modern Britain research programme. The
research they report is financed by the Leverhulme Trust.
Unions were concerned that cases submitted
to the CAC should not be lost
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M
ost people probably think that rising living
standards and wider educational opportu-
nity in the UK have increased the opportu-
nities available to young people from all
backgrounds. But how equally distributed
have these opportunities been? To what
extent has family background been a factor in determining
who has benefited most? And has the influence of family
background in this respect altered over time?
To attempt an answer to these questions, we looked at
information from two very rich British cohort datasets on all
people born in one week in 1958 and one week in 1970.
The information recorded includes family circumstances
and educational achievement during childhood and adoles-
cence; and data on employment and wages in later life. In
2000 the first full survey was conducted of the 1970 cohort
as adults, making possible, for the first time, comparisons
across the full social range between people who grew up in
the different environments of the 1970s and the 1980s.
Two reasons in particular make these interesting years for
comparison. First, it was a period when income inequality
was growing rapidly, resulting in a dramatic rise in the
number of children growing up in poverty. In the groups we
are analysing here, those living at or below the poverty level
at age 16 rose from 6% of those born in 1958 to 10% of
those born in 1970 (see Table 1). Second, the 1970 group
entered their teens just as the rapid expansion of the higher
education system began. In 1980, 13% of young people
entered higher education, rising by 1990 to 19% and by
2000 to 31%.
Our finding is that economic mobility between generations
fell significantly between 1958 and 2000. The income levels
achieved by the group born in 1970 were determined to a
significantly higher extent by the income levels of their
parents than was the case for those born in 1958. 
Let us look at the figures. The data for parental income
comes from the surveys done when our groups were 16
(i.e. in 1974 for those born in 1958 and in 1986 for those
born in 1970). For the groups’ earnings when adults, we
took the data from the National Child Development Survey
Mobility has
fallen
Jo Blanden looks at the evidence showing that social and economic
mobility in Britain fell significantly in the last decades of the 
20th century and estimates the part that the expansion of higher
education may have played in this process.
by Jo Blanden
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics
1958 1970 1958 1970
Males Males Females Females
Weekly wage £ 312.28 330.77 161.35 222.26
(NCDS Age 33; BCS Age 30) (168.04) (229.01) (112.85) (173.69)
Family income £ 384.29 437.17 383.29 430.70
(NCDS Age 33; BCS Age 30) (201.38) (323.06) (248.70) (300.54)
Parental income £ 306.40 309.75 305.48 309.79
(Age 16) (124.41) (152.03) (134.19) (148.19)
Proportion below poverty line (Age 16) .06 .11 .07 .09
Proportion with degree .17 .26 .14 .26
Sample size 2503 1969 2148 1916
Notes:
1. Standard deviations in parentheses for wage and income measures.
2. Wage and income in January 2001 prices.
3. The sample sizes are as in the Table for all variables except for family
income where they are: NCDS males 2348; BCS males 1930; NCDS
Females 2438; BCS Females 2170.
for the 1958 cohort at age 33 and from the British Cohort
Survey for the 1970 cohort at age 30. Given that these
surveys are only done at certain points in time, we have
restricted our sample to those who were in work when they
were taken. But we also have information on the earnings of
any partner in employment at that point, so we can measure
the “family” income of the members of our two groups and
can make comparisons of like with like across generations. 
Table 1 gives a summary for our two samples. It draws out
some of the key changes: family income inequality grew (as
measured by the standard deviations); child poverty
increased; the proportion of graduates rose, especially for
daughters (as is also shown in Figure 1) where the propor-
tion of those with degrees almost doubled in 12 years from
14% to 26%.
Figure 1 Rise in child poverty
Source: Gregg, Harkness and Machin (1999) ‘Poor Kids: Child Poverty in
Britain, 1966-96’ Fiscal Studies, 20, pp. 163-187
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Those living in poverty at age 16
rose from 6% of those born in 1958
to 10% of those born in 1970
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Table 2: Regression estimates of the intergenerational mobility parameter
Earnings Regressions
Regression ß ß Adjusted For Changes Change in Sample Size
in Inequality Adjusted ß
NCDS BCS NCDS BCS
Sons .098 .222 .120 .246 .126 NCDS: 2503
(.017) (.022) (.020) (.025) (.032) BCS: 1969
Daughters .169 .293 .117 .217 .100 NCDS: 2148
(.030) (.031) (.021) (.023) (.031) BCS: 1916
Family Income Regressions
Regression ß ß Adjusted For Changes Change in Sample Size
in Inequality Adjusted ß
NCDS BCS NCDS BCS
Sons .089 .272 .089 .252 .163 NCDS: 2348
(.021) (.025) (.021) (.023) (.032) BCS: 1930
Daughters .120 .288 .095 .218 .123 NCDS: 2428
(.025) (.028) (.020) (.022) (.029) BCS: 2170
Notes:
All regressions control for parents’ average age and age-squared,
as these may be linked to income through earnings growth and also
to how well the child does.
We used two approaches to measuring the intergenera-
tional links. The first was a statistical regression approach
that provides us with a measure of how much more income
we would expect the son of one family to have, compared
with the son of a family with double the income. A regres-
sion coefficient here of .3 would imply that the son of a
family with income £20,000 would earn 30% more than son
of a family with an income of £10,000. The smaller this
estimated coefficient, the weaker the link between the
income of parents and their children and thus the greater
the social mobility. Our second approach was to divide the
data on family income and children’s subsequent wages as
adults into quartiles. We then compare quartiles across the
generations to obtain the probability of children ending up
in each quartile, given where they started.
We use the regression approach to measure the link
between the income of our groups’ parents and both son’s
and daughter’s weekly earnings and for the weekly earnings
of the cohort member and any partner. As one of our
concerns here is the potential effects of the increases in
income inequality on mobility, we also produce an estimate
of mobility that accounts for the rises in inequality across
both generations. (For a detailed account of the calculation
of this estimate, see Blanden, Goodman, Gregg and
Machin, “Changes in Intergenerational Mobility in Britain”,
Discussion Paper No. 517.)
The association between parental income
and their children’s subsequent wages is
higher for the second group
In every case, the estimates of the association between
parental income and their children’s subsequent wages are
higher for the second group than for the first, indicating that
economic mobility has fallen. There are technical reasons
for believing that the actual estimates within each cohort are
understated, but our research indicates that the estimate of
the change between cohorts is accurate. For sons, the
regression coefficient rises from .098 to .222. Even when
adjustments are made for inequality, the change is similar
(.126 compared with .124). Using the previous example
again, a son born in 1958 from a family earning £20,000
would in his early 30s be earning 12% more than a son
born the same year from a family earning £10,000. But, for
comparable sons born in 1970, the difference would be
22%. Results for daughters’ earnings and for the family
earnings of both sons and daughters show changes of
similar size.

changes in intergenerational mobility can be influenced by
changes in educational opportunities and returns. The
basic idea is that parents’ income affects children's educa-
tional attainments, which in turn influence earnings. With
this model one can explain falling intergenerational mobility,
because either: a) parental income has a greater impact on
educational achievement; or b) educational attainment
generates greater rewards in the labour market. The British
evidence indicates that returns to education have, if
anything, risen in the 1990s despite the rapid increase in
educational attainment. In addition, we are currently
looking in detail at changes in the impact of family income
on education (Blanden, Gregg and Machin, forthcoming
from CEP). Here, however, we just look at the combination
of these two effects.
To explore this question, we added measures of educational
attainment to the regression models. This demonstrates the
effect of parental income on the child’s earnings, if educa-
tional achievements were fixed, by taking out the effect of
education as a transmisson mechanism. The difference
between the falls in mobility measured in Table 2 and those
in Table 4 are the part that can be explained by education.
It is clear from Table 4 that differences in educational
achievements are partly responsible for the reduction in
mobility. When the effect of education on subsequent
earnings is removed from the figures, the fall in mobility for
sons is reduced by 16 percentage points and for daughters
by 27 percentage points. A similar analysis can be carried
out using the transition matrix approach. This is done by
subtracting the part of earnings that is explained by educa-
tion and, then, dividing the children’s earnings into quartiles
as before. The resulting matrix then shows “mobility” with
the effect of education netted out. Once again, the differ-
ence between this and the unconditional transition matrix
shows the effect of education. Using this method we find
that education explains around 30% of the change for both
sons and daughters, as measured by the immobility index. 
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The regression results only give a picture of changes in
average mobility. We can get a more detailed picture from
the transition matrices. Those for sons’ earnings and
parental income for the 1958 and 1970 groups are given
below. (The matrices for daughters can be found in the
Discussion Paper No. 517.)
Table 3 contains some interesting points. First, it is clear
that there is less mobility at the top of the parental earnings
distribution than there is at the bottom. In the 1958 group,
34% of those whose parents were in the top quarter of the
distribution remained there, compared with 30% of those in
the bottom quartile. This suggests that parents have some
substantial means of ensuring the maintenance of the
position of the next generation.
When it comes to changes over time, the transition matrices
show the same trend as the regression results. In all cases,
a higher proportion of sons born in 1970 remain within the
same part of the income distribution as their parents and,
for the second group, there are less extreme movements
between generations. The results of the transitions matrices
can be summarised by adding together the values of the
cells in the diagonals and those adjacent to them. This
“immobility index” also shows a sharp rise. For the 1958
cohort it is 2.74 and for the 1970 cohort it is 2.96.
So it is clear from these figures that economic mobility
between generations has fallen in the UK in the last 40
years. The next step is to consider some reasons why. One
of the most obvious mechanisms by which relative success
and failure are transmitted between generations is educa-
tion. We have already noted that there was a substantial
increase in the opportunity for higher education for our
second cohort. How far can differing educational achieve-
ments explain the reduction in mobility that we have
observed? 
A simple formal model can be used to think about how
Table 3 Transition matrices for sons
1958 cohort Sons’ earnings quartile
Parental income quartile Bottom 2nd 3rd Top
Bottom .30 .28 .23 .19
2nd .29 .25 .24 .22
3rd .25 .26 .25 .24
Top .17 .20 .29 .34
1970 cohort Sons’ earnings quartile
Parental income quartile Bottom 2nd 3rd Top
Bottom .38 .25 .22 .15
2nd .30 .29 .22 .19
3rd .19 .29 .27 .25
Top .13 .16 .28 .43
One of the most obvious transmission
mechanisms is education
So, the UK education system played a role in the falling
mobility between the cohorts. The implication of the results
presented here is that those who took advantage of the
expansion in university places came, in general, from higher
social backgrounds. Evidence produced by the then
Department for Education and Employment suggests that
this trend continued beyond the time frame captured by our
cohorts. Its 1998 report, “Higher Education for the 21st
Century” said: “The increase in participation in the 1990s
amongst socio-economic groups A to C has been double
that among groups D and E”. Its figures showed an
increase in the participation rate of those from socio-
economic groups D-E of five percentage points (from 11%
to 16%) and an increase of ten percentage points for those
from groups A-C from (from 26% to 36%). 
This suggests that there should be further research into the
changing relationships between parental income and
education. The conclusions here from the expansion of
higher education in the UK between 1975 and 1990 are
that rising graduate numbers in themselves did not lead to
an improvement in equality of opportunity.
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ÒChanges in Intergenerational Mobility in BritainÓ,
by Jo Blanden, Alissa Goodman, Paul Gregg and
Stephen Machin (Discussion Paper No. 517) is
available from the CEP.
Table 4 Taking out the effect of cross-cohort differences in education
Regression ß ß Adjusted For Changes Change in Sample Size
in Inequality Adjusted ß
NCDS BCS NCDS BCS
Sons
Table 2 upper panel .098 .222 .120 .246 .126 NCDS: 2503
(.017) (.022) (.020) (.025) (.032) BCS: 1969
Plus son’s education .049 .149 .060 .166 .106 NCDS: 2503
(.015) (.022) (.019) (.025) (.031) BCS: 1969
Daughters
Table 2 upper panel .169 .293 .117 .217 .100 NCDS: 2148
(.030) (.031) (.021) (.023) (.031) BCS: 1916
Plus daughter’s education .057 .152 .040 .112 .073 NCDS: 2148
(.027) (.030) (.019) (.022) (.029) BCS: 1916
Those who took advantage of university
expansion came in general from higher
social backgrounds
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T
here have been dramatic changes in the struc-
ture of employment in the labour markets of
many countries in recent years. A key aspect
has been the increased demand of employers
for workers with higher educational qualifica-
tions and skill levels. 
Another dramatic change, certainly in the US and the UK in
the 1980s, has been rapidly rising wage inequality. This
coincided with the period of the most significant direct
impact of the computer revolution on the labour market,
namely the introduction of personal computers (PCs) on
desks where there had been no computer before. 
In the academic literature there has been much emphasis
on the impact of the new technologies on employers’
demand for skills. Some of this work uses evocative
phrases like “the collapse in demand for the unskilled”, “the
deteriorating position of low skill workers” and “rapidly
rising wage gaps between the skilled and unskilled”, all 
of which are in line with the notion that large shifts 
have occurred.
Certainly, many more skilled workers are now in employ-
ment than in the past, both in absolute numbers and relative
to their less skilled counterparts. Table 1 shows for the US
and the UK between 1980 and 2000 the shares of employ-
ment and hours worked and the relative wages of employ-
ees with a degree as compared with non-degree holders. It
confirms the rapid increases in the shares of relatively
higher educated workers (graduates) that have occurred in
both countries. 
It is also interesting that, despite their increased numbers,
the relative wages of more skilled workers have not fallen.
In fact, the wage gap between graduates and non-gradu-
ates rose in both countries (though at a faster rate in the
US) and widened faster in the 1980s than in the 1990s. The
table shows that higher relative wages and higher levels of
employment for graduates moved in tandem. This was true
for both decades and for both countries, though the relative
wages clearly increased by more in the 1980s than in 
the 1990s.
An intuitive way of thinking about this relative demand shift
Upgrading
the workers
Higher education levels have produced increased numbers of 
better qualified workers in the labour market, yet the differential
between skilled and unskilled wages has risen at the same time.
Stephen Machin examines the key aspects of rising labour market
inequality, with particular reference to the way in which technological
change has shifted the labour market in favour of skilled workers.
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in favour of the skilled is in terms of an economic model
where the wages and employment of skilled and unskilled
workers are the outcomes of a race between supply and
demand. The general implication is that both demand and
supply curves are shifting and the question is which curve
has moved the most. It would seem that, to have generated
simultaneously higher wages and higher employment for the
skilled, relative demand for the skilled must have increased
by more than relative supply. Put alternatively, over the
period of rising wage inequality, demand won the race and
employers were prepared to raise the pay of workers with
appropriate skills more than that for less skilled workers,
despite the fact that many more skilled workers were in the
labour market.
What might have caused this relative demand to increase
more rapidly than relative supply? A large body of work has
argued that the critical factor has been the introduction of
new technologies that are biased in favour of skilled
workers. This “skill-biased technology change” hypothesis
is founded on the notion that employers’ demand for more
skilled workers has been shaped by the kinds of new
technologies that are permeating modern workplaces. Such
new technologies lead to higher productivity, but only some
workers possess the necessary skills to use them. So
employers are prepared to increase the wages of their
skilled workforce. At the same time, less skilled workers,
who cannot operate the new technologies, find their wages
are lowered, or lose their jobs.
What evidence is there for this hypothesis? First, for the
story to hold, shifts in skill demand must clearly be variable
and that variability must be systematically related to the
introduction of new technologies. Particular workplaces,
firms or industries are likely to differ in the extent of their use
of new technologies. So some indirect evidence on the
hypothesis might come from looking at the shifts in relative
demand within workplaces or firms or industries, rather
than between them. 
Table 1 Aggregate Trends in Graduate/Non-Graduate 
Employment, Hours and Relative Wages, 
UK and US 1980-2000
UK Labour Force Survey/General Household Survey
% Graduate % Graduate Relative 
share of share of weekly wage 
employment hours (full-timers)
1980 5.0 5.1 1.48
1985 9.8 10.5 1.50
1990 10.2 11.0 1.60
1995 14.0 15.4 1.60
2000 17.2 18.8 1.64
US Current Population Survey
% Graduate % Graduate Relative 
share of share of hourly wage 
employment hours (full-timers)
1980 19.3 20.4 1.36
1985 22.0 23.6 1.47
1990 23.8 25.6 1.55
1995 25.5 28.1 1.61
2000 27.5 29.5 1.66
Sample is all people age 18-64 in work
and earning (except for relative wages,
which are for full-time workers). The
relative wage ratios are derived from
coefficient estimates on a graduate dummy
variable in semi-log earnings equations
controlling for age, age squared and
gender. The UK employment and hours
shares are from the LFS. The relative wage
gaps are from the GHS for 1980, 1985
and 1990 and the LFS in 1995 and 2000
(relative wages for 1995, the overlap year,
were very similar). They are weekly wages
because the hours question in the GHS
was changed in the 1980s. The CPS data
is the Economic Policy Institute CPS ORG
labor extracts data. I thank John Schmitt
for making them available to me.
Table 2 summarises the evidence from three studies for the
UK and US at workplace and industry level. At both these
levels of aggregation it is clear that the bulk of the observed
wage and employment shifts in favour of the relatively
skilled group occur within, rather than between, industries.
(The only exception is the Autor, Katz and Krueger result for
the 1960s.) If skill-biased technological change is even to
be a starter as a possible explanation of the observed shifts
in skill demand, it is essential that some industries should
have faster rates of skill upgrading than others.
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Table 2 Within/Between Decompositions of Skill Demand Changes
Study Unit of Analysis Time period Skill Demand Measure Annualised Change Percent Within
(Percentage Points)
Autor, Katz and
Krueger (1998)
140 US industries 1990-96 College employment share .300 87
College wage bill share .587 82
1980-90 College employment share .469 79
College wage bill share .878 70
1970-80 College employment share .586 79
College wage bill share .662 84
1960-70 College employment share .324 27
College wage bill share .511 45
Berman, Bound
and Machin
(1998)
1979-87 Non production .552 70
employment share
Non production wage .774 60
bill share
450 US
manufacturing
industries
1977-87 Non production .367 82
employment share
360000 US
manufacturing plants
100 UK
manufacturing
industries
1979-90 Non production .387 82
employment share
Non production wage .669 83
bill share
402 British
workplaces
1984-90 Non production .41 83
employment share
Machin (1996) 402 British
workplaces
1984-90 Managers employment .14 86
share
Senior technical and .19 95
professionals 
employment share
The second question is whether the identification of indus-
tries that have had faster rates of upgrading (and an analy-
sis of their characteristics) can shed light on what may
underpin the improving relative labour market position of the
more skilled. Indeed, it is clear that those industries
showing the biggest increases in relative wages and/or
employment of more skilled workers are those where
technological change has been more important. For
example, industries that have seen the fastest skill upgrad-
ing have been those spending more on Research and
More skilled workers are now in
employment than in the past
Development (R&D), producing more commercially signifi-
cant innovations and employing more workers who use
computers.
One way to test this formally is to estimate cost share
equations that relate changes in the skilled wage bill (or
employment) share in a given industry to observable
measures of technology use. Table 3 summarises some
results for the US and the UK. It is clear that, for a range of
time periods, for different levels of aggregation and for
different technology measures there is a positive associa-
tion for a given industry between shifts in the skilled wage
bill (or employment) shares and enhanced use of new
technology. Put differently, it appears that the technologi-
cally more advanced industries have shown the faster
increases in the relative demand for skilled workers. This
finding certainly supports the skill-biased technology
change hypothesis.
A third, more controversial, line of research has asserted
that individuals receive a wage premium for working with
computers. If true, this would be very much in line with the
hypothesis, since it would imply that computer users are
rewarded for the higher productivity linked to their use of
computers. The most well known paper here is Krueger’s
1993 study of US Current Population Survey data, where
he adds a “computer usage” dummy to standard earnings
functions. Even after controlling for a wide range of human
capital and job related characteristics, his analysis found a
sizable wage premium for computer users. According to his
figures, the wage premium attributable simply to using a
computer at work was 15% in 1984 and went up to 18%
by 1989, despite the rise in the total number of computer
users over the same period.
There are some clear concerns about this methodology. For
example, DiNardo and Pischke in the Quarterly Journal of
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Table 3: Regression Correlations of Skill Demand 
Changes and Technology Measures
Study Unit of Time Skill Demand Technology Coefficient Controls 
Analysis period Measure Measure (Standard Error) 
Autor, Katz 
and Krueger
(1998)
140 US 
industries
1990-96 College wage 
bill share
Industry computer 
use (1984-93)
.289 (.081) None
1980-90 .147 (.046)
1970-80 .127 (.031)
1960-70 .071 (.025)
Machin and Van
Reenen (1998)
15 UK 
manufacturing
industries
1973-89 Non production wage
bill share
R&D/Value Added .026 (.009) Change in
log(capital), Change
in log(output), 
year dummies
123 US 
industries
1960-90 Computer investment
per FTE
.130 (.027) Change in
log(capital/labour),
decade dummies
450 US 
manufacturing
industries
1959-89 Non production 
wage bill share
Computer investment /
investment
.027 (.007) Change in
log(capital/output),
Change in
log(output)
Berman, Bound
and Griliches
(1994)
143 US
manufacturing
industries
1979-87 Non production 
wage bill share
Computer 
investment /
investment
.028 (.006) Change in
log(plant/output),
Change in
log(equipment/
output), Change in
log(output)
Machin (1996) 16 UK 
manufacturing
industries
1982-89 Non production 
wage bill share
R&D/Sales .065 (.026) Change in
log(capital), Change
in log(real sales), 
1 digit industry
dummies
16 UK 
manufacturing
industries
1980-85 Innovation Count 
From 1970s
.092 (.053)
398 British 
workplaces
1984-90 Managers , senior
technical and
professional 
employment share
Micro computers
introduced
.044 (.022) Dummy for
employment decline,
1 digit industry
dummies
R&D / Sales .097 (.021)
Economics in 1997, replaced “computer use” variable with
a “pencil use” variable and uncovered an apparent wage
premium linked to pencil use. The likely explanation here is
that the “computer use” variable is a proxy for other charac-
teristics of employees not captured in the survey data and,
therefore, not controlled in the regression equation.
Nonetheless, the computer premia in Krueger’s analysis are
sizable.
Fourth, adopting a wider international perspective, looking
to see whether faster changes in skill demand are concen-
trated in similar industries in different countries could shed
further light on the validity of the hypothesis. Table 4 gives
a calculation of cross-country correlations of changes in
non-production wage bill shares of particular industries for
the period 1980 to 1990. It shows a wide cross-country
correspondence for different industries: 31 out of 36 paired
comparisons are positive and many (13) of the correlations
are statistically significant. This does suggest that skill
upgrading has a tendency to be clustered in the same sorts
of industries in different countries.
Fifth, it seems that skill upgrading has also been happening
in the more technologically advanced industries in some
developing countries. This suggests that skill-biased
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Table 4 Cross-Country Correlations Changes in Nonproduction 
Wage Bill Shares in Developed Countries: 1980-90
Sweden .15
Australia .35 .16
Japan .09 .14 .08 
Denmark .66* .06 .11 .14 
Finland .70* .12 .37* .33 .52*
Austria .27 -.44* .14 -.11 .31 .29 
UK .64* .06 .38* .01 .53* .39* .47*
Belgium .45* -.19 -.28 -.12 .41 .45* .51* .47*
Notes
Calculations based on the 28 industry data used in Berman, Bound and Machin
(1998). * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level or better. 
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Table 5 Correlations of Country-Specific Industry Skill Upgrading With Technology Variables 
Correlations of 1980s’
upgrading with US computer
usage
Correlations of 1980s’
upgrading with OECD R&D
intensity (1980-90)
Correlations of 1970s’
upgrading with US computer
usage
Correlations of 1970s’
upgrading with OECD R&D
intensity (1973-80)
High Income Group
Countries 10 10 12 12
Positive 10 8 10 10
Significant positive 5 4 6 4
Significant negative 0 0 1 1
Middle Income Group
Countries 12 12 8 8
Positives 8 9 5 4
Significant positives 3 2 3 1
Significant negatives 0 0 1 2
Low Income Group
Countries 6 6 5 5
Positives 3 3 4 2
Significant positives 1 1 0 0
Significant negatives 1 0 0 1
Notes
Taken from Berman and Machin (2000). Groups of countries are as follows.
High income: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany,
Japan, Sweden, UK, US (’80s), plus Norway, Germany (’70s).
Middle income: Colombia, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Guatemala,
Hungary, Ireland, Malta, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Turkey (’80s).
Low income: Bangladesh, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Nigeria, Tanzania (’80s).
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technology change is altering relative wage and employ-
ment outcomes globally, with the patterns seen in industri-
alised countries repeating themselves in the developing
world. Table 5 shows correlations for 28 countries (grouped
by income level) between industry changes in non-produc-
tion wage bill shares and both US computer usage and the
OECD's estimates of R&D intensity for those industries.
The pattern in the table for the high income countries again
shows a strong correspondence between skill upgrading
and technology deployment. But the same pattern is also
strong for the middle income countries. Indeed, patterns of
skill upgrading in middle income countries in the 1980s are
well predicted by the two OECD indicators of recent skill-
biased technological change. The evidence of skill-biased
technology transfer altering the mix of employment in 
the smaller sample of lower income countries is weaker,
where only half the correlations with the technology indica-
tors are positive.
Is there evidence that technology driven shifts in employer
demand have continued to affect contemporary labour
markets as they seem to have done in Table 1 between
1980 and 2000? The only data on technology measures
that exist for similar definitions at a reasonably disaggre-
gated level across the whole economy for both the US and
the UK are those measuring computer usage in the
workplace. Data on computer usage at work are available
for several years in the US in various supplements of the
monthly Current Population Survey. The first is for October
1984, with further supplements of the same structure in
October 1989 and 1993. The most recent is for October
1997. Data for the UK are more sparse. There is the British
Social Attitudes Surveys for 1985 (for a very small sample)
and for 1987 and 1990. There are also data in the more
recent 1997 Skills Survey.
A full description of the correlations between skill upgrad-
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Table 6 Changes in Computer Usage and the Wage Structure: US 1984-97
Descriptive Statistics
1984 1989 1993 1997
% using computer at work 25.1 37.4 46.6 50.6
Sample size 61667 62748 59852 56247
% graduate share of employment 21.6 23.4 24.8 26.2
% graduate share of wage bill 32.2 35.8 38.5 41.5
Sample size 168208 167526 166665 147033
Notes
1. All people with a job aged 18-64.
2. Computer numbers based on October
Current Population Survey supplement in
relevant year. Responses to question
‘Does….directly use a computer at work?’.
3. Wage data from all outgoing rotation groups
in each year (from the EPI ORG files).
4. Weighted using CPS person weights.
Table 7 Industry Level Regressions of Changes in Graduate Wage Bill Shares
on Changes in Computer Usage in the United States 1984-97
Annualised Change in Graduate Wage Bill Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1984-97 1984-89 1989-93 1993-97
Changes in % using computer at work .069 .102 .075 .021
(.025) (.031) (.050) (.050)
Sample size 660 220 220 220
Notes
1. Dependent variable is annualised change in
graduate wage bill share.
2. All regressions weighted by average of industry
wage bill across the relevant time periods.
3. Year dummies included in column (1).
4. Standard errors in parentheses.
Less skilled workers, who
cannot operate the new
technologies, find their 
wages lowered
ing and changes in computer usage at work that emerge
from all this data is contained in the paper on which this
article is based. The most striking conclusion, however, is
the strong correspondence between industry computer
usage across the two countries. In other words, it is very
much the same industries that have more employees
working with computers. It is also clear that by 1997 some
industries in both countries were at near saturation point
so far as the spread of computer use was concerned.
This, of course, causes problems for any hypothesis that
wants to relate skill upgrading in an industry to increased
computer use. 
For the US, where the data go back further to 1984, it is
also possible to look at things at a more disaggregated
level. Table 6 shows that the proportion of workers in the
US using computers doubled from 25% in 1984 to 50% by
1997. The graduate shares of both employment and the
total wage bill also rose sharply over the same period,
mirroring the figures in Table 1.
Table 7 gives estimated regression coefficients for US
changes in the graduate wage bill share on increases in
computer usage, first for the whole period from 1984 to
1997 and then for the three sub-periods for which I have
data (1984-89, 1989-93 and 1993-97). The 1984-97
regression shows a strong association between changes in
graduate wage bill shares and increased computer usage.
However, when one looks at the sub-period regressions,
the coefficient on computer usage falls over time and the
relationship disappears by the final column specification for
1993-97. It appears that some technologically advanced
industries reached saturation point in terms of computer
diffusion and thus the links between skill upgrading and
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Table 8 Changes in Computer Usage and Changes in Wage Structure in Britain in the 1990s
Skills Survey Data
1997 1997 1992 Change 
if same job 1992-1997
as 1992 (if same job)
% Using Computer at Work 68.2 71.7 54.4 17.3
Of Which:
Essential 30.3 28.6 15.7 12.9
Very Important 14.7 16.5 10.6 5.9
Fairly Important 12.7 14.1 12.9 1.2
Not Very Important 11.5 12.5 15.1 -2.6
Sample size 2467 1270 1270 1270
Labour Force Survey 
1997 1994 1992 Annualised Change 
(Percent log points)
A: 1992-1997
B: 1994-1997
% Graduate Share of Employment 14.8 13.4 12.1 A: 4.0
B: 3.3
% Graduate Share of Wage Bill 24.7 23.7 21.2 A: 3.0
B: 1.4
Notes
1. Many thanks to
Francis Green for
providing me with the
Skills Survey data
used in the upper
panel of the Table
Skill upgrading has a tendency to
cluster in the same sorts of
industries in different countries
increased computerisation, at least measured in head count
terms, no longer existed. This does not mean that skill-
biased technology change no longer exerted an influence
on the wage structure, but it casts doubt on simple
measures of computer use as explanations for skill-biased
technology change in the 1990s.
The UK situation in the 1990s is considered in Tables 8 and
9. Using the 1997 Skills Survey data, the upper panel of
Table 8 compares computer usage in 1992 and 1997. It
gives two 1997 numbers, one for the whole sample and one
for people who were still in the same job as they had been
in 1992. The top line of the table confirms that increased
computerisation of jobs carried on through the 1990s.
The breakdown made possible by the 1997 Skills Survey
into sub-groups for whom whether computers were “essen-
tial”, “very important”, “fairly important” or “not very impor-
tant” shows a rise in the first three categories and a fall in
the “not very important” group. 
The lower part of the table gives the graduate share of
employment and of the wage bill, taken from the Labour
Force Survey, for three years (1992, 1994 and 1997).
These years are chosen because an industry definition
change occurred between 1992 and 1997, which means
that it is possible to make the industry-level empirical
analysis between 1994 and 1997 for a consistent set 
of industries.
Accordingly, Table 9 gives a set of industry-level regres-
sions of changes in graduate wage bill shares in the UK in
the 1990s on changes in the percent of people using a
computer at work. The column (1) computer use variable is
for all people and columns (2), (3) and (4) gradually refine
the variable for those who reported varying degrees of
importance to working with computers. The first column
shows no relation between 1990s skill upgrading and the
increased use of computers in the 1990s. This mirrors the
US finding over the same period and supports the notion
that simple computer usage measures may not be particu-
larly good for looking at technology change in the 1990s,
because of high computer use levels in technologically
advanced industries.
However, once broken down by importance of the
computer to the job, industry skill upgrading is still associ-
ated with increased computer use. The strongest positive
(and statistically significant) association is between
changes in graduate wage bill shares and changes in the
percent using a computer for whom it is “essential” to the
job. It seems that, even in the 1990s, relative demand was
still shifting in favour of skilled workers in industries where
computers are becoming more important.
Thus the evidence for skill-biased technology change
hypothesis is substantial. But there are questions about it.
For example, other hypotheses are also consistent with the
evidence. There is still a debate as to whether technology
change or other factors, like increased trade, account for
most of the rises in labour market inequality. 
In its simplest form, the trade argument goes as follows.
Suppose there are two countries that, to start with, do not
trade with each other. Both have skilled and unskilled
workforces, which respectively manufacture skill intensive
and skill unintensive products. One country (high
wage/developed) has a comparative advantage in making
skill intensive products with skilled labour. The other country
(low wage/developing) has a comparative advantage in
making skill unintensive products with unskilled labour.
When these two countries begin to trade with one another,
according to the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model of inter-
national trade, the developed country will begin to import
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Table 9 Industry Level Regressions of Changes in Graduate Wage Bill Shares on Changes in Computer Usage in
Britain in the 1990s
Annualised Change in Graduate Wage Bill Share, 1994-97
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Changes in % Using Computer at Work -.045
(.080)
Changes in % Using Computer at Work For .086
Whom Fairly Important, Very Important or Essential (.057)
Changes in % Using Computer at Work For .106
Whom Very Important or Essential (.068)
Changes in % Using Computer at Work For .138
Whom Essential (.044)
Sample size 53 53 53 53
Notes
1. Dependent variable is annualized change in graduate wage bill share.
2. All regressions weighted by average of industry wage bill across the
relevant time periods.
3. Standard errors in parentheses.
skill unintensive products from the low wage country since
they are cheaper. This will then lower the wages of unskilled
workers in the developed country and reduce their employ-
ment levels. In this model, the rise in the relative wages and
employment of skilled workers is caused by the opening up
of trade with the developing country.
This hypothesis has intuitive appeal. However, for several
reasons, it has proven hard to back it with sound empirical
evidence. Though trade flows with low wage countries have
been rising fast in recent years, they have been from very
low initial levels and do not seem big enough to explain the
large changes in labour market inequality seen in a number
of developed countries. What is more, those industries that
have seen the biggest increases in trade with the develop-
ing world do not appear to be the ones that have seen large
labour market shifts in favour of more skilled workers. Then,
as we have already noted, skill upgrading (higher relative
wages and employment for more skilled groups of workers)
has been going on in the developing as well as the devel-
oped world. This runs counter to the Heckscher-Ohlin
model, which predicts that skill upgrading should increase
in developed economies, but that the less skilled should do
better in the developing world as demand for the products
they manufacture rises.
A further conflict with the Heckscher-Ohlin model is that
skill upgrading appears to be happening in industries that
do not trade across international borders. If one includes a
traded and a non-traded sector in that model, the prediction
would be that unskilled workers displaced from the traded
sector by the opening up to trade would find jobs in the non-
traded sector, or would lower the wages of unskilled
workers, or both. In reality, one does not see this. In non-
traded sectors (e.g. in non-manufacturing industries like
retailing) skill upgrading has also been happening (and
often at similar rates to those in traded sectors).
The absence of evidence that increased trade has been the
prime cause of increased inequalities between skilled and
less skilled workers in the past does not, of course, mean
that trade will have little impact here in future. It is implausi-
ble to suggest that globalisation is without serious ramifica-
tions for labour. However, the rises in labour market
inequality of the last couple of decades do not seem attrib-
utable to rising competition with low wage countries.
A second worry with the skill-biased technology change
argument is that the evidence supporting it mainly covers
limited time periods. Perhaps more importantly, it is also
mainly confined to manufacturing industries. This is
because of a lack of good data on technology outside
manufacturing and because researchers have wanted to
look at the same industries across countries. Some work
has managed to use data to look at longer time periods
and at the whole economy. The most comprehensive for
the US is the work already cited of Autor, Katz and
Krueger, using census data back to 1960 and focusing as
much as possible on non-manufacturing as well. They
seem to find important shifts in the skill structure of
employment that are related to technology and that have
occurred economy-wide.
A more subtle (and probably more significant) argument is
that shifts in the demand for more skilled workers have
been happening for years and that it is significant supply
changes that matter more. This argument rests on the
notion that there has been a long trend increase in demand
for skills and that movements in relative wages around this
trend are principally influenced by relative supply changes.
For example, it is well known that the supply of graduates
rose fast in the 1970s, slowed in the 1980s and then rose
again in the 1990s. The wage gap between educated and
less educated workers fell in the 1970s, rose sharply in the
1980s and probably rose, but at a much slower rate, in the
1990s. This outcome is entirely consistent with a steady
increase in demand for skilled workers, where their wage
premiums over unskilled workers are affected by 10-year
changes in relative supply.
This argument warrants attention. However, more solid
empirical work is required before it can be accepted as
substantially undermining the skill-based technology
change hypothesis. In particular, steadily rising residual
wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers,
which has been a feature of the last 20 years, is hard to
square with the patterns of supply change. 
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cult it is for outside owners or others to control or influence
the management. This is the “entrenchment effect”. 
Here the relationship between managerial ownership and
risk is also of interest. Since managers are thought to be
“risk averse”, one would expect a negative relationship
between company risk and managerial ownership. The
investment in a private company often accounts for a large
share of an individual’s wealth and is mostly not diversifi-
able. On the other hand, managerial ownership can also
serve as an outward signal of a company’s quality. A
manager will only be willing to invest large amounts in his
own company if he is convinced that it will be successful.
Banks take such signals into account when deciding on
loan applications. So, since banks are especially reluctant
to lend to risky companies, the managers of risky compa-
nies may need to make more use of this signal. In this case,
there would be a positive relationship between company
risk and managerial ownership. 
To explore these questions we have examined the evidence
from private companies in the German business-related
service sector. As can be seen from Table 1, private compa-
nies with limited liability (GmbH) are the most important
company type in Germany. (The closest counterpart to this
legal form in the UK is the private limited company.) The
limited liability of the GmbH means that owners are not
personally liable for the company’s debts. The legal form of
the GmbH is quite flexible. The articles can be adapted to
fit very small as well as very large companies. A GmbH has
at least one owner and is run by one or more managers,
who can also be owners. In general, owners share profits
according to the proportion of the firm’s equity capital they
by Elisabeth Müller and Alexandra Spitz
Elisabeth Müller and Alexandra Spitz look at the evidence from a
group of private German companies to see how the performance of
their managements is affected by whether or not they own a share 
of the equity.
D
oes the share of a company that is owned
by its management affect its financial
performance? In principle you might
expect that, in companies where owner-
ship and management control are entirely
separate, conflicts of interest would arise.
For example, an owner might be mainly
interested in profit, while a manager might have a profes-
sional interest in expansion.
So far this potential conflict of interest has mainly been
analysed in relation to public companies. One reason for
this may be the better availability of data for public than for
private companies. Yet this conflict is potentially important
also for private companies, since in this sector not all
owners are managers and not all managers are owners.
In all countries, private companies are responsible for a
substantial part of overall economic activity. In Germany, for
example, private companies with limited liability (GmbH)
have a higher share of total turnover than public companies
with limited liability (AG). In theory one might expect to find
a positive relationship between managerial ownership and
performance, as managers owning a share of the company
stand to benefit from an increase in profits. Furthermore,
they are less likely to divert company resources for private
use because they bear a larger share of the cost. This is the
“incentive effect”.
On the other hand, one might find a negative relationship
between managerial ownership and profitability, especially
in cases of very high levels of managerial ownership. The
higher the ownership stake of the managers, the more diffi-
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hold. It is important to note that the shares of a GmbH
cannot be listed on a stock exchange.
Table 1 % share of total turnover by legal form 1998 
Private limited liability (GmbH) 32
Public limited liability (AG) 22
Other forms with unlimited liability 46
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, 1998.
Data for the analysis was derived from a survey of the
German business-related service sector carried out by the
Centre for European Economic Research in Mannheim and
Creditreform, Germany’s largest credit rating agency. The
survey data was merged with information from
Creditreform’s company database. The resulting sample
covers the period from 1997 to 2000. The business-related
service sector here comprises IT services, consulting,
marketing, technical advice, machine rental, logistics and
waste disposal.
Companies were asked on a quarterly basis whether their
profits had increased, stayed the same, or decreased in the
last three months and what they expected of them for the
three months to come. On the basis of the answers about
past profitability, a performance measure was constructed
to take seasonal and sectoral effects into account. This
analysis has to be based on surveys to measure perform-
ance, as most private companies do not publish their
accounts.
To measure performance, we took the difference between
the number of times a company reported a profit increase
and the number of times it reported a decrease and
compared that with the average response from its industry
as a whole. This performance measure was calculated on
an annual basis. The exact formula used to give this
measure of relative performance is: (no. of “increases” per
company per year minus no. of “decreases” per company
per year) divided by (no. of “increases” per industry year
minus no. of “decreases” per industry per year). For
companies with above average performance, the measure
will be positive and, for companies with below average
performance, it will be negative. (Definitions of the other
variables used are given in Table 2.)
The companies included in the sample were relatively small.
They had on average only 39 employees. Their managers’
average ownership share was substantial, amounting to
almost 75% of overall capital. The typical company had six
owners, of whom on average one and a half were also
managers.
One point to be borne in mind is the possibility of reverse
causality. It is possible that the performance of a company
has an influence on the size of the ownership share a
manager is willing to take. Managers tend to be well
informed about the quality of a company before they decide
how much to invest. This could lead to higher ownership
shares in strong companies and lower ownership shares in
weak companies. However, the price that a manager has to
pay for his stake needs also to be taken into account. If a
company is known to be good, the former owners will
charge a high price and the share that the new manager
gets will be consequently lower. Nevertheless, if managers
are better informed about the potential of a company than
the owners, our results might represent an overestimate of
the effect of ownership on performance.
The results of the performance equation are displayed in
Table 3, column 1. The effect of managerial ownership on
performance has the form of an inverted “U”. Managerial
ownership seems to have a positive effect up to an owner-
ship level of around 50%, but becomes negative above
that. This suggests that up to about 50% we see the
positive impact of the “incentive effect” for managers,
whereas above 50% we see the negative impact of an
“entrenchment effect”. As measured, these effects on
performance are statistically significant.
Other findings from the analysis include:
n Companies with 100% managerial ownership perform
better than companies with some “outside” owners. The
reason may be that, in these cases, there is no conflict of
interest because there is no separation of ownership and
control.
n The number of managers with ownership stakes has a
negative influence on performance, although the effect is
not significant in the first regression. It may be that, if there
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Table 2 Definition of Variables
Variable Definition
Share Combined ownership share of all
managers in the company, measured
between 0 and 1
Risk I Standard deviation of the responses 
to the performance question 
(coding: up=2, constant=1, down=0)
Risk II Average absolute deviation of coding
forecasted return minus coding
realised return
Owner manager Number of managers who 
are also owners
Outside owner Number of owners who are not 
members of the management
Dummy No outside owner Equal to 1, if company totally
owned by managers
Bank Number of bank relationships
Size Natural logarithm of number of
employees
Dummy West Equal to 1 for companies 
in West Germany
Managers owning a share of the company
stand to benefit from higher profits
that it can take time before changes in ownership have an
effect. This confirms the inverted U-form of the impact of
managerial ownership. The maximum point increases 
to around 80%, i.e. we find a positive effect of 
managerial ownership share up to 80%, above which it
becomes negative. 
Our analysis of the relationship between company risk and
managerial ownership share also found it to be non-linear.
Ownership share first decreases as risk rises, then
increases before finally decreasing again. The negative
relationship between risk and managerial ownership share
indicates that managers are risk averse. They prefer to
diversify risk by not investing only in the company they
manage, especially as they already have their “human
capital” invested in it. After a certain point, banks could be
reluctant to lend to risky companies. Then the only way a
manager can convince the bank to lend is by holding a big
personal stake. After a certain level of risk, however, the
cost of risk bearing exceeds the advantage of signaling
company quality. So we find that in very high risk companies
the relationship between risk and managerial ownership
share tends again to be negative. 
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Table 3 Estimation Results of Fixed-Effect Regressions
Dep. Variable: Relative Performance
(1) (2)
Share 3.54*
(2.16)
Share (lag) 7.34***
(2.88)
Share squared -3.17*
(1.78)
Share squared (lag) -4.32**
(2.16)
Owner manager -0.13
(0.11)
Owner manager (lag) -0.50**
(0.21)
Dummy No outside owner 0.79**
(0.40)
Outside owner 0.19** 0.15*
(0.08) (0.09)
Bank -0.11* -0.18**
(0.15) (0.08)
Size -0.21 -0.23
(0.15) (0.26)
Number of observations: 2797 1434
Number of firms: 1351 777
F-Test: 2.06 3.10
(degrees of freedom) (7, 1439) (6, 651)
***,**,* = significant on the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level,
standard errors are in parentheses
Companies with 100% managerial
ownership perform better
are several owner-managers, it becomes more difficult to
agree on company strategy and that the incentive due to
ownership is smaller for each individual manager.
n The more outside owners, the better is the perform-
ance. In theory one might have expected this effect to be
negative, as a smaller number of owners with a larger share
of a company should have more incentive to monitor
management performance. However, the data does not
show such an effect. It may be harmful to companies, if
outside owners exert too much influence, since they are
typically less well informed about the business than the
managers. The greater the number of outside owners, the
smaller the ownership share and the less the influence of
each one.
n The more bank relationships a company has, the worse
is its performance. This is compatible with the argument that
banks with a high loan to one company will devote more
resources to monitoring its management than several banks
each with smaller loans. But it could also mean that compa-
nies performing badly seek loans from several banks,
because no one bank wants to make a big commitment. 
Table 3, column 2, gives the results of our regression analy-
sis, including lags of the share variables to allow for the fact
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t is a cliché that we live today in a
knowledge economy. But what are
the economics of the process of
knowledge creation?
The evidence of history is that
intellectual property rights have made
at best only a minor contribution to
the development of the knowledge
economy. But occasionally, and in an
almost arbitrary way, they have
conferred extraordinarily large
rewards. There seems to have been
little economic logic involved.
Albert Einstein devised the general
theory of relativity in his spare time,
while employed as a clerk in the
Patent Office at Zürich. (His Swiss
Patent Office salary is arguably the
most important contribution that the
system of intellectual property rights
ever made to knowledge.) Once his
genius was recognised, Einstein was
never again without a university
appointment and was honoured
wherever he went. But he never
became a rich man. Certainly not in
the way in which Bill Gates or
Michael Eisner became rich men.
Along with the theory of relativity,
probably the most significant single
pieces of new knowledge obtained in
the twentieth century were the
invention of computing and the
unravelling of DNA. A machine that
can do sufficiently long strings of
calculations can do almost anything.
This is now taken for granted, but it
was once an insight of startling
originality. While Babbage was the
builder of the first “analytical engine”
by John Kay
Intellectual property rights have produced strikingly large financial
gains for some individuals and corporations, but the big winners 
have seldom been involved in the creation of new “big knowledge”.
John Kay looks at examples to how the system has operated and
concludes that it has little economic or commercial logic.
Arbitrary
rights
in the nineteenth century, the
mathematical and philosophical
concepts behind the modern
computer were established by Alan
Turing, a fellow of King’s College,
Cambridge, at the time. When the
Second World War broke out, Turing
joined the code-breakers at Bletchley
Park. This group – one of the most
astonishing concentrations of
intellectual firepower ever assembled
– built what is generally thought of as
the first operational computer. 
Turing – a lonely, tortured homosexual
who committed suicide – spent the
rest of his short life working for the
British government.
The structure of DNA was specified
in 1953 at Cambridge University by
Francis Crick and James Watson,
both postdoctoral research workers
in the university. Like Einstein,
Watson became a fêted scientist.
Neither ever became what the City
would describe as seriously rich.
Business people have sometimes
argued that contributions to
knowledge such as the discovery of
relativity, the invention of computing
and the unravelling of DNA were not
“commercial”. But relativity led
directly to the discovery of nuclear
power and, by redefining the basis of
modern physics, has influenced the
design of devices from spaceships to
computers. If the idea of computing
is not commercial, it is hard to
imagine what is. And genetics and
biotechnology will almost certainly
transform medicine and nutrition in a
very few decades.
Not even business people would
deny that antibiotics, television and
improved seed varieties are
“commercial”. The discovery that
certain moulds would kill bacteria is
generally ascribed to slovenly
practice in Alexander Fleming’s
laboratory in St Mary’s Hospital,
Paddington, in 1928. Despite the
apparently obvious practical
significance of this discovery, it was
a decade before research by
Howard Florey and Ernst Chain at
Oxford University, sponsored by the
Rockefeller Foundation, led to the
creation of a drug that could be
administered to patients. The result
was the development of the 
modern pharmaceutical industry 
and the virtual elimination of
infectious disease as a cause of
death in otherwise healthy adults in
rich countries.
Television was invented more or less
simultaneously in several countries.
As is common with new technological
products, when all the necessary
pieces of science and engineering
are available it is a matter of chance
who happens to put them together
first. In the United States, the
individual concerned was Philo T.
Farnsworth. Or so the courts
decided when they upheld his
patents. After years of costly litigation
with the Radio Corporation of
America (whose chief executive was
famously reported as saying: “We
don’t pay royalties; we receive
them”), Farnsworth ultimately won the
credit for the invention. But he was
almost ruined in the process and
received little financial return,
eventually selling out to RCA for a
modest sum.
The most important economic event in
Palanpur in the last fifty years was the
introduction of semi-dwarf wheat –
the new “green revolution” crops that
have made India self-sufficient in
grain. These discoveries were the
result of research in Mexico promoted
(again) by the Rockefeller Foundation.
My sample of major twentieth century
innovations is small and controversial.
Still, few people would disagree that it
includes some of the twentieth
century discoveries which most
changed our economic lives. What
motivated these innovations?
The American business model has
little of interest to say about these
processes of knowledge generation.
Whatever may have inspired these
discoveries, it was not a combination
of great greed and little government.
Neither Einstein nor Turing “did it for
the money”. Einstein was spurred by
the desire to get a better job, but, in
general, the excitement of the process
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of discovery itself, and the social
rewards offered to a renowned
discoverer, appear to be the dominant
factors.
Indeed, the record of twentieth
century history is that none of its most
important inventions was made by
private sector companies. The
strongest private sector contender is
the transistor, discovered by William
Shockley in Bell Laboratories in 1947.
But this is an exception which proves
the rule. Bell Labs was owned by
American Telephone and Telegraph
but had much of the character of a
rich man’s hobby, since regulatory
restrictions prevented it from
developing innovations directly
relevant to the AT&T business. In the
event, the transistor proved rewarding
for Shockley and the company,
Fairchild Semiconductor, that he
established, but not for AT&T. Indeed,
when the parent company spun off its
research laboratories as a separate
company, the resulting business,
Lucent Technologies, was not
particularly successful.
So neither commercial businesses,
nor the prospect of large rewards to
individuals, played any large part in
the creation of “big knowledge”. Nor
did state control of innovative activity.
Despite the active promotion of
research by the Soviet government,
the country’s record in the
development of original knowledge is
lacklustre. Russia and the USSR
have won 11 science Nobel Prizes,
compared with 13 each for
Switzerland and The Netherlands.
Despite high standards in Russian
medicine, no important new drugs
were developed there and the
evolution of computers and
electronics – even for military use –
lagged far behind the West. The
worst episode in Russian science
was the era of Lysenkoism. The
absurd theories of an
undistinguished biologist who had
captured the ear of Stalin had a
major influence on Soviet agricultural
policy in the decade before the
Second World War. Until the Great
Leap Forward in China, the Russian
and Ukranian famines of the 1930s
were the worst in world history.
In fact, of all the inventors I have
discussed, the only one employed by
a government at the time of his
principal discovery was Einstein. And
the Swiss government employed
Einstein as a clerk in the Patent
Office, not to discover relativity. The
remarkable fact is that the principal
funding of major twentieth century
innovations came from private
charitable foundations. The record of
the Rockefeller Foundation alone – as
the principal source of finance for
both the development of penicillin
and the green revolution – is
remarkable. When you add in the
contributions to knowledge – good
and bad – to have come from the
University of Chicago, the economic
significance of Rockefeller’s
philanthropy proved far greater than
the economic significance of his
creation of Standard Oil.
Philanthropy is important to
knowledge, because it is the vehicle
of pluralism in research. Of the six
innovations described, three –
antibiotics, computing and DNA –
occurred in Britain. The institutions in
which the research occurred were
not dependent on state funding at the
time, but are so now. The growth of
government finance and control of
universities in Europe has been
directly paralleled by their decline as
important centres of research.
Europe accounted for 75% of Nobel
Prizes in science before 1939; the
US has taken over 75% of Nobel
Prizes in science since 1969. It now
seems that the new “big knowledge”
is most likely to be discovered in the
pluralist higher education system of
the United States.
Of course, not all knowledge
achieves the exquisite level of
abstraction of the theory of relativity,
the concept of a computer, or the
nature of life. Much of it is the
product of diligent record keeping.
Information like the times of television
programmes, or of buses, trains or
planes. Lists of plumbers. Share
prices. Where to find Bristol
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Gardens. This is the kind of
information we need and use 
every day.
Broadcasters compile their
programme schedules well in
advance. They want to disseminate
that information widely – no one will
watch a programme they don’t know
is on – but broadcasters also want to
maximise the value of their information
as a commercial asset. Until 1990,
British broadcasters balanced these
interests by themselves publishing
weekly magazines, Radio Times (for
the BBC) and TV Times (for
commercial broadcasts), carrying
their own programme listings, for
which they held the copyright, but not
those of their rivals. The only way to
obtain comprehensive information
about future programmes was to buy
both magazines. Both were extremely
profitable. A change in the law in
1988 removed the broadcasters’
copyright in their listings. As a result,
competitive listings magazines
appeared, greatly reducing the profits
of Radio Times and TV Times.
The first maps were compiled as
products of art and scholarship. But
map production became a business.
Mapmakers plagiarised information
and competed against each other on
the basis of the clarity and accuracy
of their mapping. Reputation was
important to a mapmaker from the
beginning: you would not know a map
was defective until you had bought it,
used it, and gotten lost.
Mapping gained importance as
military organisation developed, since
the movement of large armies
required careful logistics that
demanded accurate mapping. So
maps were commissioned and paid
for by governments. The British
government’s maps agency is still
called the Ordnance Survey, reflecting
its military origins. The needs of the
armies for maps no longer seem so
pressing, so governments have
expected their agencies to find more
commercial outlets for their data and
skills. Also, the needs of the army are
not the same as the needs of the
person invited to dinner for the first
time at a house in Maida Vale. 
This insight led Phyllis Pearsall, rain-
soaked by her attempt to find Bristol
Gardens, to compile the first street
atlas of London. Mrs Pearsall walked
London, recording junctions, house
numbers and construction that had
taken place since the last
comprehensive Ordnance Survey
nearly twenty years earlier. Today
there are many different street atlases
of London (and of most other towns).
In March 2001, the Automobile
Association paid £20 million to settle
a legal dispute with the Ordnance
Survey. Copyright law prevents the
AA from copying Ordnance Survey
maps. But it does not protect the
knowledge that the M1 runs from
London to Leeds. There is clearly a
large grey area in between and the
AA seemed to have moved too far to
one side of it.
So can you “own” knowledge? Not
really. But, if you can’t, won’t that
discourage you from acquiring it?
Probably not, if that knowledge is of
the path-breaking kind developed by
Einstein or Turing. But, if it is the dull
but essential knowledge of the
location of every house in London
that can be acquired only by 
trudging its streets, perhaps it will.
This is an issue with which the law
and regulation of market economies
struggles.
For there is no guarantee that
markets will produce either the right
amount or the right kind of
knowledge. Markets may fail to
produce new knowledge, because
once knowledge is obtained the
discoverer cannot keep it to himself or
herself. Conversely, the knowledge
economy may lead to monopoly,
because the costs of knowledge are
fixed and sunk.
Still, rich states do not, as a whole,
seem to be doing badly in developing
a knowledge economy. Big
knowledge – relativity, computing, the
structure of DNA – is produced with
philanthropic support, most often in
the reflective environment of
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universities, and motivated by the
creative instincts of its authors. Small
knowledge – television listings, maps,
financial information – is generated
and distributed by the market like any
other product. Surprisingly small
amounts of differentiation seem
sufficient to ensure competitive
supplies of most kinds of sm
all knowledge.
Big or small, to be precious,
knowledge must be of kind that can
be protected by copyrights or patents
and leveraged by firms to establish
commercial monopolies. By this
standard, the two most precious
pieces of knowledge of the twentieth
century are not relativity, or the
structure of human life. They are the
software code for Microsoft’s
operating system, MS-DOS, and 
the chemical formulation of anti-
ulcerant drugs.
Microsoft has benefited from several
idiosyncrasies of US legislation. The
law allows Microsoft exclusivity in the
software code of MS-DOS, but
denies Apple exclusivity in the
concept of the graphical user
interface. This gives the Seattle
company sole rights in Windows. At
the same time as US law permits this
monopoly, it controls it only weakly.
Copyright and patents can often be
converted around. This is what
happened when James Black
discovered a drug for blocking
receptors on the walls of the stomach
and hence reducing the acidity which
causes ulcers. Following this
invention, a British pharmaceutical
company, Glaxo, refocused its related
research and came up with another
anti-ulcerant, Zantac. Zantac is similar
in pharmacological effect to Black’s
drug but has fewer side effects. Like
most best-selling drugs, it does not
cure the underlying condition, but it
relieves or eliminates its adverse
effects. Sufferers need drug treatment
for extended periods, possibly for life.
At around the same time as Glaxo
launched Zantac, two Australian
physicians, Robin Warren and Barry
Marshall, discovered that many ulcers
were caused by a bacterium,
Helicobacter pylori, and could be
cured by an intensive programme of
antibiotics. Chemical substances
such as Zantac are patentable.
Treatment protocols are not. Zantac
became the world’s best selling drug
and its $10 billion or so profits made
Glaxo one of the world’s largest
pharmaceutical businesses. Warren’s
and Marshall’s rewards for their
discovery are limited to the academic
kudos they enjoy and the gratitude of
those patients who know the origins
of their successful treatment.
The random incidence of precious
knowledge is striking. The copyrights
in Microsoft’s operating system and
the patents in Glaxo’s Zantac are
probably the most valuable copyrights
and patents in history. But the work
they relate to was of little originality
and the truly innovative work was
undertaken by other companies. The
returns seem altogether
disproportionate to either the costs or
the consequences of the activities
concerned. We can be confident that
there would still have been personal
computers and anti-ulcerants even if
no copyright or patent protection had
ever existed – as there would have
been relativity, transistors, radios and
television. 
These strikingly large but arbitrary
rewards attract very considerable
resources into areas where the
possibility of such returns exists –
such as the production of user-
friendly software and drugs that
relieve chronic conditions – and into
essentially imitative production of
popular music and pulp fiction. It also
concentrates resources and market
powers in a few hands, threatening
the very pluralism on which
innovation depends. The behaviour of
Microsoft demonstrates that this is no
imaginary threat. 
John Kay is an associate member of the
CEP and Visiting Professor at the LSE.
This article is based on a chapter in his
forthcoming book “How Markets Work”,
due to be published by Allen Lane/Penguin
Press in March next year.
The Centre for Economic Performance
and the Intellectual Policy Institute have
launched a joint research initiative to
improve knowledge and understanding of
the economic and professional issues
involved in Intellectual Property.
The random incidence of precious
knowledge is striking
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